R.A.V v. City of St. Paul: How the Supreme Court Missed the Writing on the Wall by Crowley, Andrea L
Boston College Law Review
Volume 34
Issue 4 Number 4 Article 3
7-1-1993
R.A.V v. City of St. Paul: How the Supreme Court
Missed the Writing on the Wall
Andrea L. Crowley
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrea L. Crowley, R.A.V v. City of St. Paul: How the Supreme Court Missed the Writing on the Wall, 34
B.C.L. Rev. 771 (1993), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol34/iss4/3
NOTES
R.A.V. v. CITY OF ST PAUL: HOW THE
SUPREME COURT MISSED THE
WRITING ON THE WALL
On June 21, 1990, a group of young white men fashioned a cross
out of chair legs, attached it to a propane tank, and set it on fire in
the yard of the African-American family who lived across the street.'
When the police arrived at the scene, the young men ran inside a
house belonging to one of the group members and began making
another cross to burn. 2 All of the individuals involved in making and
setting the cross on fire knew that this family was African-American."
There is a name for this type of activity other than arson, trespass or
disorderly conduct.' According to the United States Congress, these
young men committed a hate crime."
It is estimated that the number of hate crimes in the United States
increased by 24.4% from 1991 to 1992." Forty-six states and the District
I Brief for Respondent at 1-2, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (No. 90-7675).
2 Id. at 3.
3 Id. at 2. The young men were prosecuted under a St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance and
ultimately challenged its constitutionality. See R.A.V. v. City qf St. Paul, 112 S. CL 2538, 2538
(1992). For a full discussion of the R.A.V case see infra notes 195-276 and accompanying text.
4 The ordinance under which these young men were prosecuted provided Mau
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender
commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990). See RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541,
5 SeeHaso Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, (b) (1), 104 Stat..140 (1990). The statute
defines a hate crime as: "[C]rimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion,
sexual orientation, or ethnicity, including where appropriate the crimes of murder, non-negligent
manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault, simple assault, intimidation; arson; and destruc-
tion, damage or vandalism of property." Id.
This statute was passed in response to an increase in hate crimes throughout the country
and requires the Attorney General to maintain annual statistics on hate crimes. T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance of Racism, 63 U. CoLo. L. REv.
525, 344-45 (1992),
Leading Law Firm Releases First National Law Enforcement Survey for 1992 Revealing Sig-
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of Columbia have enacted some type of hate crime legislation intended
to punish perpetrators motivated by bias.' The increase in hate crimes
is particularly relevant in light of the fact that psychologists who have
studied the effects of racism and commentators on hate crimes suggest
that there are negative physical and emotional effects tied to hate
speech.8
In 1992, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the United States Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of a St. Paul ordinance designed
to punish hate crimes.° In RA. V, the Court held that the St. Paul
ordinance was facially unconstitutional because it regulated speech on
the basis of its content." Although the Minnesota Supreme Court had
interpreted the St. Paul ordinance to proscribe only "fighting words,"
an area of speech that had been considered to be outside the realm
of First Amendment protection," the Supreme Court determined that
the alleged conduct was constitutionally protected.' 2
This Note examines the R.A. V decision in light of previously
existing First Amendment jurisprudence and the growing problem of
hate crimes in the United States. Section I examines the area of hate
crimes generally and the psychological ramifications of racially preju-
diced speech and conduct." Section II reviews the state of First Amend-
ment law prior to the RA. V. decision." In particular, this section
focuses on the areas of speech and conduct in which the Supreme
Court has permitted regulation with a particular emphasis on the area
of child pornography." Section III sets out the details of RA. V v. City
nifirant Increases in Hate Crimes, P.R. Newswire Ass'n, Jan. 14, 1993 (LEX1S, Nexis Library, Current
tile) [hereinafter National Law Enforcement Survey]. The survey was compiled by the national law
firm of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, and estimated national statistics were based on information
from ten jurisdictions, Id.
7
 See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI BRITH LAW REPORT: HATE CRIMES STATUTES: A
1991 STATUS REPORT 21 (1991) [hereinafter ADL . LAW REPORT].
See KENNETH B. CLARK, DARK GHETTO DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL POWER 63-67 (2d ed. 1959);
Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling,
17 Ham,. C.R.-C.L, 1. REV. 133, 143 (1982); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, '1336 (1989).
9
 See R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992). See supra note 4 for the full text
of the St. Paul ordinance.
I° R.A.V., 112 S. CL at 2542.
11 In re Welfare of RA.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991).
12 See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
13 See infra notes 18-74 and accompanying text This Note focuses on the effects of racially
motivated hate speech, particularly speech directed at African-Americans. Although this author
understands the damaging effects of all bias-motivated speech, this Note's focus is a function of
both the available psychological data dealing with prejudice against African-Americans and the
nature of the crime in R.A.V
14 See infra notes 75-192 and accompanying Lela.
15 See infra notes 99-192 and accompanying text.
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of St. Paul.' 6 Finally, section IV analyzes the compelling state interest
in protecting racial minorities from hate speech and proposes that the
Court abandon the RA. V, reasoning and apply a victim-centered ap-
proach to hate crime legislation,' 7
I. HATE CRIMES
Hate crimes in the United States have increased dramatically in
recent years.' 8 Members of minority groups have been harassed, beaten
and even killed as a result of bias-motivated crimes.'' In an attempt to
punish those motivated by bias who commit these crimes, legislators
around the country have passed hate crime statutes.°
One recent survey estimated that hate crimes in the United States
increased a total of 24.4% from 1991 to 1992. 21 For example, in Boston,
the number of hate crimes increased by 15.6% from 218 in 1991 to
252 in 1992.22 Hate crimes in New York City increased by 20%—in 1991
there were 525 hate crimes reported and in 1992 there were 630. 23 In
1992, in Florida alone, the number of bias motivated crimes increased
over 66% from 125 to 208. 24
Hate crimes are alarming not only because of their statistical
increase, but also because of their violent nature. 25 For example, on
New Year's Day 1993, Christopher Wilson, a thirty-one year-old black
man, was abducted by three white men, doused with gasoline and set
on fire while vacationing in Tampa, Florida. 26 Near the site where
16 See infra notes 193-275 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes '276-94 and accompanying text.
15 See National Law Enforcement Survey, .supra note 6; Larry Tye, Hate Crimes Increase, May
Hit Record in '91, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 14, 1991, at 1.
19 See ADL LAW REPORT, supra note 7, at 12-13. The ADL's report describes incidents of hate
crimes throughout the United States. Id. In California, a man was convicted under California's
religious terrorism statute for engaging in a campaign of harassment against a family he mistak-
enly believed was Jewish. Id, at 12. In Florida, five racist skinheads attacked and beat another
skinhead after finding out he was Jewish. Id. In New York, a Jewish student from Australia was
attacked and killed by a mob angry over what they thought was racist treatment favoring Jews
over blacks by the local ambulance unit. Id. at 13.
"See id. at 6-11. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. 609.2231, .28, .5531, .595, .605, .735.795 (West
1987 & Supp. 1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 651.6 (1986 & Supp. 1990); Ott. REv. STAT. 181.550
(1991); St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance § 292.02, supra note 4.
21 National Law Enforcement Survey, supra note 6.
22 Id.
29 Id.
24 Id.
2.5
	
A Shocking Hate Crime; In Orange County, an Incident of Gay-Bashing at Its Worst, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1992, at 6 [hereinafter Shocking Hate Crime]; 3 Whites Charged in Burning of a
Black, N.Y. "Fumes, June 15, 1993, at 13.
26 3 Whites Charged in Burning of a Black, supra note 25, at 13. Wilson suffered second and
third degree burns on forty percent of his body. Id.
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Wilson was burned police found a note signed "KKK" that read "[o]ne
less nigger and one more to go."27 In Laguna Beach, California, a
fifty-five year-old gay man was beaten unconscious by a teenager wit-
nesses claim yelled, et's go down to Mountain Street to get some
... fags.""
Many states have enacted statutes that punish individuals for com-
mitting crimes such as those discussed above. 29 There have been at least
two types of hate crime statutes enacted." One type of statute punishes
crimes motivated by bias. 3 t Another type, the type the majority of states
have adopted, acts to enhance an individual's sentence if it is found
that the defendant was motivated by animosity toward the victim's race,
gender, ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation." As of 1991, forty-six
states and the District of Columbia had enacted some type of hate
crime legislation."
Many commentators on hate speech have pointed out that to fully
understand the necessity for hate crime legislation it is important to
consider the damaging effect that hate speech has both on its victims
and on other members of their minority group." One commentator
has examined the damage done to minority groups as a result of a
history of bias against that particular group." Others have focused on
the physical and psychological effects of hate speech on its individual
victims." Studies of the effect of racism and racist speech indicate that
27 Id. One of the suspects in this case was known to have a Nazi swastika tattooed on his arm.
Id.
28 Shocking Hate Crime, supra note 25, at 6.
29 See ADL LAW REPORT, supra note 7, at 22-23.
3' See id. at 21.
s1 The St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance is this type of statute because it makes it a
misdemeanor to engage in certain activity based on racial, ethnic, religious or gender bias. See
St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance § 292.02, supra note 4.
32 The ADL has designed a model sentence enhancing hate crimes statute:
A. A person commits the crime of intimidation if, by reason of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation of another
individual or group of individuals, he violates Section 	 of the Penal Code (insert
code provision for criminal trespass, criminal mischief, harassment, menacing,
assault and/or other appropriate statutorily proscribed criminal conduct).
B. Intimidation is a	 misdemeanor/felony (the degree of the criminal liability
should be at least one degree more serious than that imposed for commission of
the offense).
ADL LAW REPORT, supra note 7, at 4. The majority of states have enacted this type of statute. See
Hate Redux, NAT'L Lj., Nov. 23, 1992, at 7.
33 ADL LAW REPORT, SUPTa note 7, at 21; see also DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM & AMERICAN
LAW 479 n.29 (3d ed. 1992).
34 See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 8, at 134; Matsuda, supra note 8, at 2321-22.
35 See CIARK, supra note 8, at 63-67.
36
 See Delgado, supra note 8, at 143; Matsuda, supra note 8, at 2336.
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hate speech has real, long-lasting negative effects on minority adults
and children."
Kenneth Clark, a noted professor of psychology, has examined the
damaging effects of racism on the psyche of African-Americans both
as individuals and as a collective race. 38
 In the early 1950s, Clark
prepared a report for the White House Conference on Children and
Youth examining black children's perceptions of race.'9 In his study,
Clark evaluated the racial preferences and awareness of children ages
three to seven.'" Clark asked a group of children the following ques-
tions about two dolls, one black and one white: 1) "[g]ive me the doll
you like best"; 2) "[g]ive me the doll that is the nice doll"; 3) "[g]ive
me the doll that looks bad" and 4) "[g] ive me the doll that is a nice
color."'" The majority of black children at every age indicated a clear
preference for the white doll and rejection of the black do11. 42 Clark
concluded that the fact that black children expressed a preference for
the white doll reflected their perception that society prefers white
people."
Clark explained that children's first awareness of racial distinc-
tions is accompanied by an evaluation of these racial distinctions.'"
Children learn to evaluate racial differences according to society's
standards while at the same time identifying themselves with one or
the other racial group. 45
 In other words, a black child simultaneously
learns that he or she is black and that society does not value black
people as much as white people. 4° Clark asserted that the most damag-
ing effect of this realization is the burden placed on minority children
who may, as a result, suffer from a distorted or damaged individual
57 See KENNETH B. CLARK, PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD 24, 37 (2d ed. 1955); Delgado, supra
cote 8, at 137-39.
58 See generally CIARK, SI/pre/ note 37, at 17-37; CLARK, supra note 8, at 63-1i7.
59 CLARK, supra note 37, at x-xi. PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD is a reprint of Clark's study
prepared in conjunction with the White House Conference on Children and Youth. id. This study
was cited in Brawn v. Board of Education in support of the Court's conclusion that segregation in
schools had negative effects on black children. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,
494-95 & n.11 (1955). Clark's study indicated to the Court that the self-esteem of black children
was severely impaired as a result of their sensing a societal preference for whites. CLARK, supra
note 37, at 37. See also Delgado, supra note 8, at 142-43 (arguing Clark's study indicates necessity
for creation of tort action for racist speech). The Brown Court used Clark's study of black children
as evidence of the absolute necessity for desegregation in public education. Id. at x-xi.
40 CIARK, supra note 37, at 19.
'I Id. at 22-23.
4 '1
 M. at 23.
45 1d. at 24.
44 Id. at 23.
45 CLARK, supra note 37, at 23.
46 See id. at 23-24.
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personality.47 For example, some black children go so far as to deny
their racial identification as a result of society's preference for whites.48
In 1965, Clark further examined the damaging effects of racism
in Dark Ghetto Dilemmas of Social Power. 49 In this work, Clark argued
that the experiences of African-Americans as a race shape their per-
ceptions of themselves and their place in society. 5° As children, many
African-Americans were consistently rejected and experienced the
overwhelming perception that they were less important than their
Caucasian counterparts.m This sense of worthlessness carried over into
their adult lives, resulting in the belief that minorities do not deserve
anything more than this rejection from society as an individual or as a
group.52 The constant reinforcement of the idea that as an African-
American an individual is less important, attractive or likely to succeed
often results in self and group hatred. 53 Clark concluded, in Dark
Ghetto, that this sense of inferiority is never truly lost and manifests
itself in a lack of motivation to succeed in the workplace, a fear of
competing with Caucasians, and a sense of hopelessness in changing
or contributing to the community."
A more recent study, conducted in 1985, evaluated the effect of
racist speech on the perceptions of listeners. 55 The study revealed that
racial slurs invigorate negative feelings about racial minorities in those
who hear them.55 Two psychologists staged debates between two stu-
dents, one black and one white." The debate topic was the value of
nuclear energy, and was scripted word for word so that the student
opposing nuclear energy always had the stronger arguments. 58 The
black students argued each side an equal number of times. 58 During
some of the debates the psychologists placed a student in the audience
who made a "clearly audible" racial remark about the performance of
the black debaters.5° When asked who won the debate, the audience
47 Id. at 37.
48 See id. at 37. Clark told of a young boy who tried to convince his psychologist that his skin
color was the result of spending the summer at the beach. Id.
49 See CLARK, supra note 8, at 63-67.
5° See id. at 63-64.
51 See id. at 64,
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 See CLARK, Supra note 8, at 67.
55 See Jeff Meer, Slurred Speech, PSYCH. TODAY, July 1985, at 8-9.
56 Id. at 9.
57 1d. at 8.
58 Id.
59 See id.
6° Meer, supra note 55, at 8. The planted student would comment at the close of the debate
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showed a preference for the white debaters, even when they argued
the weaker position. 6 ' The researchers concluded that because both
the white and the black students argued from identical scripts the
preference for white debaters showed racial prejudice." In the in-
stances where a racial comment was made, the students rated the black
debaters' skills lower than they did when no comment was made." The
psychologists concluded that the racial slur tapped negative beliefs
about the black debaters that influenced the students' impression of
the black debaters' skills."
Hate speech also has been shown to cause physical and psycho-
logical distress in its individual victims. 65 Especially when directed at a
member of a class that has been the historical recipient of discrimina-
tion, hate speech can cause immediate psychological and emotional
distress." Furthermore, victims of hate speech suffer from nightmares,
psychosis and even suicidal tendencies.° In addition to the psychologi-
cal ramifications of hate speech, victims also experience physiological
effects such as increased pulse rates, difficulty in breathing and post-
traumatic stress disorder."
In Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, Professor Richard Delgado argued for the creation of a
cause of action for injuries sustained as a result of hate speech."
Professor Delgado argued that the emotional and physical effects of
racist speech are severe enough to warrant civil liability against the
perpetrators." Although courts have yet to recognize such a cause of
action, many perpetrators of hate speech have been held liable under
other civil statutes and causes of action. 7 '
that "there's no way that nigger won the debate." Id. In the rest of the debates either no comment
was made regarding either team or a racially neutral comment was made about the black team,
such as, "there is no way the pro (con) debater won the debate." Id.
61 See id. Most of the students thought the anti-nuclear position won in most of the debates;
however, more students thought the anti-nuclear position prevailed when argued by the white
students. Id.
62 Id., at 9.
631d.
64 Id.
°Matsuda, supra note 8, at 2336. Derrick Bell has compared the damage to victim's of hate
speech to that experienced by women as a result of pornography. BELL, supra note 33, at 522
n.19.
66 Delgado, supra note 8, at 134.
67 See Matsuda, supra note 8, at 2336.
66 Id.
lig Delgado, supra note 8, at 134.
7° See id. at 143, 149.
71 See, e.g., Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 (11th Cir. 1989), In
Vance, the United - States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a reasonable jury
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In sum, the overall increase in hate speech in recent years and the
response of legislators to this increase has been substantial." The need
for such a legislative response is illustrated by the well-documented
effects of racism and racist speech on both its victims and society as a
whole." Racist speech and attitudes have been shown to cause physi-
ological effects as well as lowered self-esteem, lack of self-worth and
lack of motivation."
II. FIRST AMENDMENT LAW PRIOR TO R.A•V V. CITY OF ST. PAUL
Hate crime legislation has been challenged as a violation of the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution." The First Amend-
ment guarantees that neither Congress nor any state may make a law
abridging the freedom of speech." The United States Supreme Court
has, however, recognized that states may restrict speech in certain
circumstances without violating the First Amendment." In some cir-
cumstances, the Court has held that certain types of speech or conduct
do not warrant First Amendment protection." These exceptions to
First Amendment protection have been predicated on the lack of value
inherent in certain speech or the danger associated with the speech."
could conclude that a black female who suffered a nervous breakdown allegedly caused by racial
harassment on the job was a victim of racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id.
In Vanre, the plaintiff, a black female, accused Southern Bell of racial harassment in violation of
§ 1981. Id. at 1505.
During her employ at Southern Bell, Vance alleged that a noose was hung at her work station
on two separate occasions. Id. at 1506. Subsequent to these incidents, Vance suffered from an
anxiety attack on the job. Id. at 1507. As a result of the attack, Vance consulted a clinical
psychologist who determined that Vance should be reassigned to a new department because of
the stress she was experiencing on the job. Vance, 863 F.2d at 1508. The appellate court reasoned
that the district court erred in its application of the hostile environment. standard and held that
a reasonable jury could have concluded that Vance was the victim of racial harassment in violation
of § 1981, Id. at 1511.
72
 See National Law Enforcement Survey, supra note 6.
73 See id.; ADL LAW REPORT, supra note 7, at I.
74
 Delgado, supra note 8, at 143; Matsuda, supra note 8, at '1336.
76
 Ste, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2541 (1992).
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The text of the First Amendment reads: 'Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
" See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982) (statute regulating child pornography
is constitutional); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973) (states may constitutionally
regulate obscene material); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (state may
constitutionally regulate fighting words).
78 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65 (child pornography); Miller, 413 U.S. at 36-37 (obscene
material); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (fighting words).
79 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 (child pornography has dangerous effects on its child victims);
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A. General First Amendment Guarantees
The freedom to speak and express oneself embodied in the First
Amendment has been celebrated as the best way to ensure the spread
of political truth and encourage the discourse of important and con-
troversial issues. 8" Justice Holmes asserted that the First Amendment
must protect against governmental suppression of speech because the
truth of statements can only be tested in the marketplace of ideas. 81
Inherent in the guarantee of the First Amendment is the notion that
free discussion of ideas, even repugnant ideas, leads to truth.82
In addition to protecting the written and spoken word, the guar-
antees of the First Amendment have been held to apply to expressive
conducts' The United States Supreme Court has recognized that some
conduct may be sufficiently communicative to warrant First Amend-
ment protection." The Court has stated that in determining whether
conduct will be considered speech, it will consider whether the actor
intended to convey a specific message, and whether there was a likeli-
hood that the expressive message would be understood by those who
saw it." If the actor intended to—and did—convey a message that
would be understood by those who saw it, that conduct will be consid-
ered speech for purposes of the First Amendments" The Court has,
however, historically afforded conduct less protection than pure
speech.87
Speech and conduct have long been recognized as rights that are
not absolute and are subject to governmental regulation in certain
circumstances.s8 For example, states may regulate certain types of
speech or conduct in order to preserve peace, order and rnorality. 8" In
Miller, 413 U.S. at 36-37 (obscene material is devoid of redeeming social value); Chap/it/sky, 315
U.S. at 573 (fighting words may be regulated because they incite violence).
AO See, e.g., Whitney V. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
81 See Abrams v. United States, '250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting),
82 See id.
es Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 408, 415 (1974) (hanging flag out window with peace
symbol affixed to it was expressive conduct protected by First Amendment),
84 See id.
83 See id. at 410-11.
88 See id. at 415.
87 See LAultENcti H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 826 (2d ed. 1988). See, e.g.,
Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. '284, 291-92 (1957) (law banning peaceful labor picketing
for illegal purposes is constitutional) (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 335 U.S.
490, 503 (1949)).
88 E.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927).
89 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (1991) (state may regulate nude dancing
because regulation serves to protect societal order and morality); Ch aplinsky v. New Hampshire,
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addition, speech or conduct that may incite riots or immediate illegal
action can be proscribed consistently with the First Amendment. 90 The
government may also regulate speech or conduct that is without re-
deeming social value or is immoral."
There are two ways that a state can restrict speech: 1) the govern-
ment may impose restrictions aimed at the specific message or the
effects produced by the awareness of the message or 2) the govern-
ment, to pursue other goals, may constrict the flow of information by
limiting the activity through which the information is transmitted or
by enforcing rules that discourage the communication of ideas 
. 92 Any
government regulation aimed at the communicative impact (the mes-
sage) of speech is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amend-
ment. 93
 The general guarantee of the First Amendment is that a state
cannot restrict expression because of its message, ideas, subject matter
or content." A regulation aimed at restricting expression because of
its content will be unconstitutional unless the government can show
that the message falls into one of the areas of expression the Court has
determined are open to regulation or furthers a compelling state
interest.95
A regulation aimed at the noncommunicative impact of speech is
constitutional so long as it does not overburden the flow of informa-
tion.96
 In determining whether a restriction overburdens the flow of
information the Court applies a balancing test. 97 The value of the
speech or conduct is weighed against the governmental interest in
restricting it."
315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (state may regulate fighting words to protect society from breach of
peace).
9° See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (speech that incites "imminent lawless
action" may be constitutionally proscribed); Chaphnsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (words that tend to incite
breach of peace may be constitutionally proscribed).
81 See Barnes, 111 S. CL at 2462 (state may regulate nude dancing because regulation serves
to protect societal order and morality); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 479, 484 (1957)
(obscenity is without redeeming social value and may be constitutionally proscribed).
92 TRIBE, supra note 87, at 789-90. Tribe asserts that the Supreme Court has broken its
analysis into two "tracks." Id. at 791. Track one analysis deals with government regulation aimed
at the communicative impact of the speech. Id. at 791. For example, a regulation providing
punishment for publications critical of the state or a ban on the teaching of a foreign language
would be subject to track one analysis. See id. at 789, 791-92. Governmental regulation aimed at
the noncomrnunicative impact of speech, for example, a prohibition against the use of loud
speakers in residential areas, would be subject to track two analysis. See id. at 790, 792.
88 Id. at 790. For the purposes of this Note a "track one" regulation will be referred to as a
"content-based" regulation.
94 1d. at 790.
95 1d. at 791-92.
96 /d. at 792.
97 TRIIIE, supra note 87, at 792.
98 Id.
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B. Areas Where Content-Based Regulations Have Been Upheld
The United States Supreme Court has upheld regulation of
speech based on its content in certain areas." In some cases, the Court
has concluded that a content-based regulation is constitutional because
the type of speech is devoid of value.'" In other instances, the Court
has allowed content-based regulations because the effect of the speech
is such that regulation serves a substantial governmental interest. 1 °' In
both of these instances, the Court weighs the value of the speech
against the interest in regulating it in order to determine if First
Amendment rights can be abridged.'"
In 1942, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the United States Su-
preme Court held that New Hampshire could constitutionally pro-
scribe conduct likely to cause a breach of the peace.'" Chaplinsky
involved a Jehovah's Witness who was convicted under a New Hamp-
shire statute for addressing another citizen in the street as "a God
damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist."'" The Court reasoned that
the speech at issue in this case was likely to provoke the average person
to retaliate and cause a breach of the peace.'" The Court upheld the
statute as a constitutional regulation of "fighting words"—words likely
to cause a breach of the peace.'"
gg See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982) (statute regulating child pornog-
raphy is constitutional); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (states may regulate commercial speech based on content because states have interest
in protecting consumers from deceptive commercial messages); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (libelous speech not constitutionally protected); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (states may constitutionally regulate obscene material); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (state may constitutionally regulate fighting words).
" I See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (obscenity is without redeeming
social value and can be constitutionally proscribed); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572-73 (fighting
words tend to incite breach of peace and lend little to search for truth),
1 ° 1 See Barnes, Ill S. Ct. at 2460-61 (state may regulate nude dancing because regulation
protects societal order and morality); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 (use of children in pornography is
harmful to their physical and emotional health).
102 See, e.g., Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757-58, 762 (value in pornographic depictions of children is
"de minimis" and harm caused to children is substantial); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572-73 (fighting
words tend to incite violence).
16A Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
104 Id. at 569. The statute in Chaplinsky provided that;
Lnlo person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other
person who is lawfidly in any street or other place, nor call him by any offensive or
derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with
intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful
business or occupation.
Id. at 569.
105 Id. at 574.
106. 1d. at 573.
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The New Hampshire statute prohibited individuals from address-
ing others in a public place with offensive, derisive or annoying words
with intent to offend or annoy.'" Chaplinsky challenged the statute as
a violation of the First Amendment. 108
 The United States Supreme
Court upheld the statute as a narrowly tailored attempt at punishing
speech that was likely to cause a breach of the peace. 1 °9
 In addition,
the Court asserted that there were certain areas of speech that did not
deserve constitutional protection, including fighting words."° Thus,
the Court held that the New Hampshire statute restricting Chaplinsky's
speech was constitutional." 1
The overriding idea in Chaplinsky has been identified as the sin-
gling out of that speech that is of little or no social value and therefore
does not contribute to any search for truth." 2 The Chaplinsky Court
distinguished words used to provoke action from words that tend to
inspire dialogue." 3
 The statements made in Chaplinsky were labeled
fighting words because they tended to provoke acts of violence rather
than human discourse." 4
 The First Amendment protects speech but
does not protect every possible way of expressing an idea." 5
In addition to fighting words, the United States Supreme Court
has addressed whether states may constitutionally regulate obscene
material." In 1957, in Roth v. United States, the Court held that ob-
scenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech." 7 In
Roth, an individual was convicted under the federal obscenity statute
for mailing obscene materials." In its reasoning, the Court first ad-
dressed the general proposition that the First Amendment does not
provide protection for all speech." The Court explained that histoti-
1 "7 Id. at 569.
1 "8
 See Cluiptinsky, 315 U.S. at 571.
uri Id. at 573.
110 1d. at 571-72.
" Id. at 573.
112 'DUBE, supra note 87, at 839.
"3 See Chaplinsky, 315 U,S. at 572.
"4 See id.
115 ,SeeTR1n1i, supra note 87, at 839.
"Gli.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1972) (Court considered constitutionality of
California obscenity statute); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 479 (1957) (Court considered
constitutionality of federal obscenity statute).
I" Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
118 Id. at 480. The statute in Roth provided that "[e]very obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy
book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent charac-
ter .. Ns declared to be nonmailable matter .... Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing ...
anything declared by this section to be nonmailable ... shall be fined ...." 18 U.S.C. § 1461.
"9 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 482.
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cally states had constitutionally prosecuted certain types of speech.'"
The Court went on to reason that obscene material, material defined
as "dealing with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interests,"121 has
historically been considered without redeeming social value.' 22 The
Court relied on the fact that over fifty nations and forty-eight states
and the United States Congress had enacted obscenity laws.'" Thus,
the Court held that obscenity is not an area of speech that falls under
constitutional protection."'
Sixteen years later, in Miller v. California, the Court reaffirmed its
holding in Roth and clarified the appropriate standards for determin-
ing if material was in fact obscene.'" In Miller, an individual had been
convicted of sending unsolicited obscene material in violation of a
California statute. 128 The material, which depicted groups of people
engaged in various sexual activities, was sent unsolicited to a restaurant
where it was opened by the owner and his mother. 127 In upholding the
California statute, the Supreme Court reasoned that California has an
interest in prohibiting the dissemination of obscene material when it
was likely that the material will offend unwilling recipients. 128 The
Court held that California's statute did not violate the First Amend-
ment.""
In so holding, the Court articulated a new standard for determin-
ing whether or not material is in fact obscene.'" Rather than requiring
that the material at issue be determined to be "without redeeming
social value," the Court held that material must be evaluated under
contemporary community standards as applied by the average per-
son.'" Under this standard, material would be considered obscene if
it appealed to the prurient interests, depicted or described sex in an
obviously offensive way, and lacked serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value.' 32
 The Court rejected the idea that in order for material
to be obscene it must be completely without redeeming social value
12° Id. at 482-83. For example, the Court cited the faci that slates had legislated against libel,
blasphemy and even obscenity. Id.
121 Id. at 487.
/22 id. at 484.
123 Id. at 485.
124 Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
125 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,36-37 (1973).
126 /d. at 17-18.
127 ./d. at 18.
12131d.
129 Id. at 36-57.
ImMiller, 413 U.S. at 24.
131 1d.
192 Id.
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and instead concluded that obscenity could be determined on the basis
of community standards.'"
In Roth and Miller; the United States Supreme Court carved out
an exception to First Amendment protection for obscene material.'"
In upholding the obscenity statute in Roth, the Court relied on the
historical perception that obscene material is undeserving of First
Amendment protection because it is without redeeming social value.'"
In Miller; the Court relied on the fact that obscene material may offend
unwilling viewers to uphold the constitutionality of California's stat-
ute.'" Thus, obscenity, like fighting words, fell outside the parameters
of First Amendment protection.' 37
In addition to allowing regulation of obscenity, the Court, as
recently as 1991, held that states may constitutionally proscribe nude
dancing in public places.'" In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an Indiana indecency
law that required nude dancers to wear a certain of amount of clothing
while performing in public.'" In Barnes, two South Bend, Indiana
establishments, the Kitty Kat Lounge and Glen Theatre, challenged the
constitutionality of the Indiana indecency law."° The Court reasoned
that prohibitions on public nudity protect societal morality and or-
der.' 41
 The Court concluded that the protection of morality is a sub-
stantial state interest and held that Indiana could constitutionally pro-
hibit nude dancing."'
Initially, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Indiana granted an injunction after finding that the Indiana Public
Indecency statute was unconstitutionally overbroad.'" On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit remanded the
case to the trial court after finding that a previous interpretation of
the statute by the Indiana Supreme Court precluded a finding of
overbreadth. 14 ' On remand, the trial court held that nude dancing was
133 Id.
134 See id. at 36; Roth at 485.
115 Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
136 Miller, 413 U.S. at 36-37.
157 Compare Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (obscenity not constitutionally protected speech) with
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (fighting words may be constitutionally proscribed).
139 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Ill S. Gt. 2456,2460,2463 (1991).
139 See id. at 2460. The Indiana Public Indecency Statute required dancers to wear "pasties"
and a "G-String" while performing. Id.
190 1d. at 2458-59.
141 Id. at 2461.
142 Id. at 2460,2462.
145 Barnes, I11 S.Q. at 2459.
1441d.
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not expressive conduct deserving of First Amendment protection."' A
panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that nude dancing was
expressive conduct and therefore deserved First Amendment protec-
tion."' The court of appeals then reheard the case en banc and held
that nonobscene nude dancing was expressive conduct protected by
the First Amendment. 147
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that
the Indiana statute requiring that dancers wear "pasties" and a "G-
String" did not violate the First Amendment." 8 The Court reasoned
that a state could regulate expressive conduct if the regulation fur-
thered an important governmental interest, the governmental interest
was unrelated to the suppression of the expression, and the regulation
was no greater than was necessary to further that governmental inter-
esti° In applying this test, the Barnes Court inferred Indiana's interest
in regulating nude dancing as an attempt to protect societal order and
morality. 150 The Court reasoned that public indecency statutes, such as
the Indiana ordinance, reflected public morality and a general disap-
proval of appearing in the nude in public places. 35 ' The Court exam-
ined the historical existence of public indecency statutes in Indiana
designed to protect morals and public order. 152 The Court concluded
that the governmental interest in preserving morality was unrelated to
the suppression of free expression because the statute proscribed all
public nudity, not only nude dancing.'" The Court reasoned that the
application of the statute to nude dancing was not a prohibition of the
erotic message but rather a general prohibition of public nudity. 154
Finally, the Court found that the statute was narrowly tailored to pro-
"5 Id.
14('
	 at 2459-60.
I 47 /d. at 2460.
148 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
149 Id. at 2460-61. The Barnes Court relied on United States v. O'Brien, in which the Court
held that a congressional amendment to the Universal Military Training and Service Act that
prohibited the knowing destruction of a draft card was constitutional. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,367,
370 (1968). O'Brien involved an individual who burned his draft card on the steps of a Boston
courthouse to protest the Vietnam war. Id. at 369. The Court reasoned that where speech and
nonspeech are combined in expressive conduct, governmental interest in regulating the non-
speech element can justify incidental infringements on the First Amendment. Id. at 376, In
Barna, the Court reiterated the test enunciated in O'Brien to determine when governmental
regulation can infringe incidentally on expressive conduct. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460-61.
15° See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461.
151 id.
I 52 /d. at 2461-62.
153 See id. at 2462-63.
154 Id. at 2462-63.
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tect morality and public order because it only required the dancers to
wear "pasties" and a "GString" while performing) 55
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed with the majority's
conclusion that the Indiana law was constitutional2 56 Justice Scalia
reasoned that the Indiana indecency statute was not aimed at expres-
sion at all, but at conduct. 157 According to Justice Scalia, the statute was
not enacted in order to stifle expressions of eroticism but to control
public nudity)." Justice Scalia also asserted his belief that morality plays
an important role in determining the necessity for certain regula-
tions)" Justice Scalia urged that American society, and in fact all
societies, have prohibited certain activities because they are considered
immoratiGo The purpose of the Indiana statute, according to Justice
Scalia, was to enforce the traditional moral belief that people should
not expose their naked bodies in public) 6 '
In 1982, in New York v. Ferber, the United States Supreme Court
held that a statute prohibiting the distribution and sale of child por-
nography was constitutional)" In Ferber, the owner of a Manhattan
bookstore sold two sexually explicit films involving young boys to an
undercover police officer)" In upholding the constitutionality of the
statute, the Court reasoned that the state's compelling interest in
protecting children from the negative effects of child pornography
outweighed its value.' 64 Thus, the Court held that the sale and distri-
bution of child pornography is not entitled to constitutional protec-
tion.' 65
The Supreme Court in Ferber framed the issue as whether the New
York state legislature could prohibit, for the purpose of protecting
children and preventing their abuse, the distribution of material that
depicts children engaged in sexual conduct regardless of whether the
material is judged obscene.'€'6 The Court noted that there was a rela-
' 55 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463.
156 see id.
157 See id.
158 See id. at 2464 (quoting Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1120 (Easter-
brook, J., dissenting)).
159 See id. at 2465.
160 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2465.
nil Id. Justice Scalia explained that he believed that Indiana's nudity law would be violated
if "... 60,000 fully consenting adults crowded into the Hoosierdome to display their genitals to
one another, even if there were riot an offended innocent in the crowd . . . ." Id. at 2465. Thus,
justice Scalia asserted that it was not the fact that someone may be offended by nudity that makes
it proscribable but rather its inherent immoral character. Id.
162 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764, 765 (1982).
163 Id. at 751-52.
164 Id. at 756, 762-63.
165
 See id. at 765.
166
 Id. at 753.
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tionship between children involved in pornography and psychological
problems in later life.' 67 Children used in child pornography not only
showed a tendency to have trouble forming intimate relationships in
later life, but also were more likely to become sexual abusers them-
selves.'" Also, research indicated that sexually exploited children be-
come predisposed to self-destructive behavior including alcohol and
drug abuse.'" The Court, stating its view that New York had a compel-
ling interest in protecting children in general, reasoned that New York
also had a compelling interest in protecting children from the physical
and psychological harms associated with child pornography.'" In ad-
dition, the Court cited the fact that forty-seven states had enacted
statutes to regulate the child pornography industry was indicative of
the severity of the effects on children."'
The Court then noted that it had upheld laws that were content-
based in the past where the evil to be regulated drastically outweighed
the value of the speech. 172 Child pornography, according to the Court,
possessed "de minimis" value because it was unlikely that pornographic
material depicting children would be considered a necessary aspect of
a literary, educational or scientific work. 17" In light of these factors, the
Court held that the New York statute proscribed an area of speech that
was not entitled to First Amendment protection.'"
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court considered a state's
ability to regulate the possession of child pornography in Osborne v.
Ohio. 17' In Osborne, the Court held that Ohio could constitutionally
prohibit the possession of child pornography.'" Osborne involved an
individual who was convicted of possessing child pornography in his
home in violation of an Ohio statute.'" The Court first explained that
the child pornography industry is underground, thus allowing for the
sale and distribution of such material to go unnoticed.'" The Court
u'7 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n.9. In a footnote, the Court expounded on the problem of child
pornography in society as a whole, ld. at 749 n.1. As an example, the Court cited statistics showing
that as many as 30,000 children had been sexually exploited its Los Angeles. Id.
168 Id. at 758 n.9.
169 Id. (citing Densen & Gerner, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography: Medical, Legal, and
Societal Aspects of the Onnmerrhil Exploitation of Children, reprinted in U.S. DEPT. or 14KAt:rn Am)
IlumAN SERNIGE.s, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CUILDREN: SF:U(7MM READINGS 77, 80 (1980)).
1 " Id. at 758.
171 1d. at 749.
172 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64 (referring to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942)).
1725 Id. at 762-63.
174 Id. at 765.
175 0sborne v. °hip, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 1695 (1990).
176 1d. at 1697.
171 1d. at 1695.
178 See id. at 1697.
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reasoned that states have taken a necessary step in the regulation of
the child pornography industry by proscribing possession because the
distribution industry is underground.'" The Court further explained
that states have an interest in encouraging the destruction of child
pornography, which is achieved through laws proscribing possession.'"
The pornographic material produced serves as a permanent record of
the child victim's abuse.' 81
 The Court explained that this record's
permanent existence tends to haunt the children depicted therein for
many years.'" The Court concluded that bans on possession encourage
destruction, thereby eradicating the record of abuse.'" Destruction,
the Court noted, is also essential to taking the material out of circula-
tion and thus prohibiting it from being used as a tool for pedophiles
to seduce other children.'"
The Court in Ferber and Osborne focused on the negative effects
of child pornography on the children involved in its making.'" These
negative effects served, according to the Court, as a compelling state
interest that justified the prohibition of the sale, distribution and
possession of child pornography.'" Thus, child pornography does not
fall within the realm of constitutionally protected speech.'"
In Chaplinsky, Roth, Barnes and Ferber, the United States Supreme
Court carved out exceptions to the First Amendment's protection on
speech.' 88
 The Court in Chaplinsky focused on the lack of value and
the inherent danger in fighting words.'" The Roth Court relied on the
historical regulation of obscenity to conclude that obscene material
was without redeeming social value and thus not deserving of First
Amendment protection.'w In Barnes, the United States Supreme Court
relied on the preservation of morality and societal order to uphold the
regulation of public nudity. 19' Finally, in Ferber; the Court found regu-
179 id.
18() Osborne, 110 S, Ct. at 1697.
Id. at 1697 & n.7.
182
1839
im Id.
1115 See Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1697; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 & n.9.
186
 See Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1697; Ferber, 458 U.S, at 757-58.
187 Ferber; 458 U.S. at 765; see Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1697.
Im Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460-61 (holding nude dancing may be constitutionally proscribed);
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 (holding child pornography not constitutionally protected speech); Roth,
354 U.S. at 485 (holding obscenity not constitutionally protected speech); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S.
at 573 (holding fighting words may be constitutionally proscribed).
189 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
190 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
191 See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461.
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lation of child pornography necessary in light of the serious effects of
pornography on the children involved in its making.' 92
III. THE R.A.V. V. CITY OF ST. PAUL DECISION
In 1992, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the United States Supreme
Court was faced with the question of whether the St. Paul, Minnesota
Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance violated the First Amendment. 193 As
in the case of ChaplinsIty, Roth, Ferber and Barnes, the Supreme Court
had to decide whether it would fashion an exception to First Amend-
ment protection.'" The Court refused to allow St. Paul to regulate hate
speech through its ordinance, holding that the Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance was unconstitutional.'" The majority based its holding on
their assertion that the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance was
an impermissible content-based regulation of speech.' 96 The concur-
ring Justices, three of whom wrote separately, agreed that the ordi-
nance was unconstitutional, but based their opinions on a finding of
overbreadth.' 97
R.A.V., a minor, was charged under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance for burning a cross in the yard of an African-Ameri-
can family's home.'" The ordinance made it a misdemeanor to place
a symbol on public or private property that one knows arouses anger,
alarm or resentment on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender.'" The trial court granted R.A.V.'s motion to dismiss on the
ground that the ordinance was unconstitutionally content-based and
overbroad.'"
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Matter of Welfare of RA. V,
reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for trial."' The
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime
192 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758.
193 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2541 (1992).
194 See id. at 2547; Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460-61 (holding nude dancing may be constitution.
ally proscribed); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 (holding child pornography is not constitutionally
protected speech); Roth, 354 U.S, at 485 (holding obscenity is not constitutionally protected
speech); Chaplinshy, 315 U.S. at 573 (holding fighting words may be constitutionally proscribed).
195 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
11113 /d. at '1542.
107 See id. at 2550 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 2561
(Stevens, J., concurring).
199 Id. at. 2541.
1911 St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance § 292.02. For the full text of the ordinance, see
supra note 4.
299 R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
211 in re the Welfare of RA. V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Minn. 1991).
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Ordinance could be narrowly construed as applying only to fighting
words, a category of speech that falls outside First Amendment protec-
tion, and, therefore, was not unconstitutionally overbroad. 202 The court
prefaced its discussion and reasoning with the assertion that whenever
possible the court will narrowly construe a statute so as to confine it
to activities that fall outside First Amendment protection. 2°3 The Min-
nesota Supreme Court reasoned that the St. Paul ordinance did not
attempt to proscribe all cross burning, but only the type that one knows
would create alarm or incite anger based on racial, ethnic, gender or
religious bias. 244 The court held that the ordinance, as it was construed
to proscribe only fighting words, did not violate the First Amend-
ment.208 In so holding, the court noted that although the ordinance
could have been more carefully drafted, as construed it was a narrowly
tailored attempt to fulfill the compelling governmental interest in
protecting the community from bias-motivated threats to public or-
der. 2°8
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling. 207 In an opinion authored by
Justice Scalia, and joined by Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Souter and
Thomas, the Court held that the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordi-
nance was facially unconstitutional because it proscribed speech on the
basis of its content.2°8
In presenting its case to the Supreme Court, St. Paul asserted
three main arguments. 20° First, St. Paul argued that the ordinance, as
construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, applied only to fighting
words and therefore was not unconstitutionally overbroad or imper-
missibly vague. 210 Second, St. Paul asserted that the ordinance was a
content-neutral attempt to protect victims from the secondary effects
of biased speech rather than an attempt to proscribe the speech it-
self.2 " St. Paul explained that its intention in enacting the ordinance
was to protect specified groups of individuals who were particularly
susceptible to victimization based on their membership in an histori-
202 Id. at 510.
" Id. at 509.
204
 /d. at 510.
"r' Id.
2°6 Matter of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 511.
207 Id. at 2542, 2550.
208 /d. at 2541-42.
"See Brief for Respondent at 5, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (No.
90-7675).
210 1d.
2 " Id.; see R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
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tally oppressed group. 2 ' 2 Finally, St. Paul argued for acceptance of the
Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute as a narrowly
tailored attempt to serve the compelling state interest in safeguarding
the rights of individuals historically subject to discrimination. 2 ' 3
The Court, despite these arguments, held that the St. Paul Bias-
Motivated Crime Ordinance was an unconstitutional content-based
prohibition of speech.2 t 4
 The R.A. V Court began its analysis by accept-
ing the Minnesota Supreme Court's construction of the St. Paul ordi-
nance as applying only to "fighting words." 215 Although the Court
accepted this interpretation, it rejected the idea that because the ordi-
nance only applied to an area of speech it had previously described as
unprotected (fighting words) that area of speech was completely un-
deserving of First Amendment protection.m The Court reasoned that
the government can proscribe certain types of speech, such as libel or
obscenity, but may not constitutionally proscribe only libelous or ob-
scene speech conveying a certain message.217
 For example, the Court
distinguished between regulating obscenity as a category of speech and
regulating only that obscenity directed at the government. 218
 In so
reasoning, the Court noted what it called the "commonplace" idea that
speech can be regulated on the basis of one characteristic, for example,
the action entailed in the speech, but not on the basis of another
characteristic, such as, the idea expressed by the speech. 2 ' 9 In other
words, Justice Scalia explained that a "noisy sound truck" could be
regulated based on the mode of the communication (the use of a loud
and disturbing mechanism) but not based on disagreement (or agree-
ment) with the underlying inessage.220 Justice Scalia compared fighting
words to a noisy sound truck because like the truck, fighting words
could be regulated based on their mode of communication but not
based on their underlying message. 221
 The Court concluded that simply
because the state had the authority to proscribe fighting words on the
212
 R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
213 Brief kw Respondent at. 5, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (No, 90-7675);
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
214 Compare Brief for Respondent at 5, R.A.V. v. City of St.. Paul, 1 12 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (No.
90.7675) with R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
215 	112 S. Ct. at 2542.
216 1d. at 2543 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957); Bcauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Chaptinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).
217 See id. at 2543.
218 see id.
M See id. at 2544.
22° See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2544-45.
221
 /d. at 2545.
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basis of the unprotected features of the words—what the RA. V Court
calls a "non-speech element of communication"—did not mean that
the government could regulate fighting words based on an opinion or
belief regarding the message expressed by the words."'
The R.A. V Court admitted, however, that this limitation on con-
tent-based regulation was not absolute and that there were certain
circumstances where content discrimination might not infringe upon
First Amendment consideration S. 2"
 The Court observed that where the
foundation for the content-based distinction was the same as the foun-
dation for proscribing the entire class of speech, the concern over
censorship of ideas did not exist. 224
 The Court explained by citing the
proposition that a state may regulate what it considers to be the most
obscene material—that which is the most sexually explicit or offen-
sive—but may not prohibit only obscene material including a specific
political message .225
 This distinction was based on the Court's claim
that a neutral restriction on an entire class of speech does not invite
the danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination. 226
In applying these ideas to the Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance,
the Supreme Court concluded that the ordinance was facially uncon-
stitutional because it only proscribed those fighting words that incited
violence due to race, religion, ethnicity or gender. 227
 Justice Scalia
explained that the statute did not cover individuals who used fighting
words in connection with the expression of other ideas, for example
homophobic ideas. 228
 Furthermore, the Court found fault with what it
called the ordinance's "viewpoint discrimination." 22" The Court noted
that the ordinance effectively barred one side of a debate by prohibit-
ing fighting words based on notions of racial supremacy, but not those
fighting words based on notions of racial equality."" Although the
Court claimed to accept St. Paul's assertion that it was the responsibility
of communities to confront issues of group hatred, the Court con-
cluded that the community viewpoint cannot compromise First
Amendment principles by regulating speech based on its content."'
Justice Scalia also concluded that the St. Paul Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance did not regulate a category of fighting words that
222 M
2" Id.
224 Id.
22s 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
221
 Id. at 2545.
227 Id. at 2547.
2213 1d.
220 Id.
214 ' See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548.
231
 See id.
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was proscribable for the same reason that the entire category of fight-
ing words is proscribable. 2g2 The Court explained that fighting words
do not deserve constitutional protection because of their mode of
communication rather than the nature of the ideas expressed with
them.'" In other words, fighting words, according to the Court, fall
outside First Amendment protection because of the manner in which
they are expressed rather than the specific message that is expressed.'"
The Bias-Motivated Crime ordinance was not, Justice Scalia explained,
a general prohibition of fighting words, but was instead a prohibition
of fighting words that convey bias-motivated hatred.'• Thus, the Court
concluded that the Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance was an attempt to
curb the expression of particular ideas rather than to regulate a mode
of expression.'"
The Court rejected St. Paul's assertion that although the ordi-
nance was arguably content-based, it was narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling community interest. 237 Although the Court claimed to ac-
cept the interest in securing the human rights of historically oppressed
groups, it rejected the notion that the Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance
was necessary to achieve this goal.'" The Court concluded that an
ordinance that was not limited to race, religion, ethnicity and gender
would have the same effect while not asserting the local government's
contempt for the biases singled out in the ordinance.'" The Court
reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling and held that the St.
Paul ordinance was unconstitutional. 240
The concurring Justices agreed that the St. Paul Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance was unconstitutional.'" All of the concurring Jus-
tices, however, based their decisions on their conclusion that the stat-
ute was overbroad rather than on the finding that it was unconstitu-
tionally content-based. 242 The concurring Justices harshly criticized the
majority for manipulating long-accepted First Amendment analysis. 243
232 Id.
233 Id. at 2548-49.
234 Id.
238 See R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
736 a
237 1d. at 2549-50.
238 Id.
2=21 Id. at 2550.
24° RA. V., 112 S. Ct. al 2542,2550.
241 Id. at 2550 (White, j., concurring); id. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 2561
(Stevens, J., concurring).
242 Id.
245 /d. at 2551 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2561 (Blacktnuti, J., concurring); id. at 2561
(Stevens, J., concurring).
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Justice White opened his concurring opinion by stating that his
agreement with the majority extended only to the conclusion that the
statute was unconstitutional. 244
 justice White argued that certain areas
of speech can be permissibly proscribed because they lack the values
the First Amendment intended to safeguard. 245
 Justice White asserted
that certain categories of speech, such as child pornography, obscenity
and libel were content-based yet the First Amendment did not apply
to them because their expressive content was insignificant."' Justice
White argued that it was inconsistent to hold that certain categories of
speech were not deserving of First Amendment protection, while main-
taining that certain subcategories of these broad categories were de-
serving of First Amendment protection.247
 In other words, Justice White
reasoned that a subset of a class of speech not worthy of First Amend-
ment protection was, by definition, undeserving of constitutional pro-
tection.248
 Justice White further explained that under Chaplinsky,
fighting words were not expressive in nature and therefore regulation
of certain fighting words did not serve to suppress ideas or view-
points. 219
 Justice White called the majority's treatment of the St. Paul
ordinance an "underbreadth creation" that only served to protect
speech already determined to be worthless. 2"
Justice White criticized what he called the majority's "second
break with precedent" by ignoring traditional strict scrutiny analysis. 25 '
In particular, Justice White criticized the RA. V. majority's assertion
that to constitutionally regulate hate speech, St. Paul should have
created a statute that prohibited all fighting words. 252 Justice White
concluded that although St. Paul could have constitutionally regulated
fighting words that incite a breach of the peace based on race, ethnic-
ity, gender or religion, St. Paul's ordinance was unconstitutionally
overbroad because it reached expression beyond only fighting words. 2"
244 Id. at 2550 (White, j., concurring).
245 RA. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2551.
249 Id. at 2552.
247 1d. at 2553.
249 Id.
249 See id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
25° R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
251 Id. at 2554. Justice White compared Justice Scalia's treatment of the St. Paul ordinance
with the majority opinion in Burson v. Freemon, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992), decided one month
before R.A. V 112 S. Ct. at 2554. In Burson, the Court applied strict scrutiny to a content-based
statute that prohibited the display of campaign material within one hundred feet of an election
site, See Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1848, 1851. Although the Court recognized that the statute was
content-based in that it only prohibited political speech, the Court concluded that it was not
necessary for the government to prohibit all speech at or near election sites in order for the
statute to be found constitutional. See id. at 1850, 1855.
252 R.A.v., 112 S. Ct. at 2555 (White, J., concurring). Justice White described the majority's
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the R.A.
Court ignored the fact that all of First Amendment jurisprudence had
been based on developing categories of speech that most often were
determined by the content of the speech. 254 Justice Stevens criticized
the majority's use of dicta to support its assertion that the Court had
articulated a near-absolute prohibition on content-based reg-ulation. 2"
In reality, Justice Stevens asserted, whether or not speech was protected
was determined by the content of the speech. 256 Justice Stevens but-
tressed his argument by citing instances where the Court had upheld
content-based restrictions, such as restrictions on certain movie thea-
ters based on the content of the movies shown therein. 257
Justice Stevens' opinion differed from Justice White's in that Jus-
tice Stevens concluded that the traditional categorical approach taken
by the Court in the past no longer made sense. 258 Although Justice
Stevens disagreed with Justice White's traditional approach, he also was
unwilling to . accept the majority's approach. 259 Instead, Justice Stevens
argued for a more subtle and complex approach to First Amendment
analysis that considered the content and context of the speech at
issue.266 In applying this approach to the St. Paul ordinance, Justice
Stevens reasoned first that the ordinance, as it applied only to fighting
words, regulated "low-value" speech. 261 Secondly, Justice Stevens ex-
plained that the St. Paul ordinance applied to conduct or expression
rather than spoken or written words. 262 Next, Justice Stevens examined
the context in which these fighting words were regulated. 263 The
fighting words regulated in this case were, according to Justice Stevens,
a type of physical intimidation undeserving of First Amendment pro-
tection merely because the words were embroiled with a message of
racial hatred.'"
abandonment of traditional strict scrutiny analysis, the analysis used by eight out of nine Justices
in the Burson cage, as "misguided" and "mischievous at best." Id. at 2555,2560.
253 Id. at 2559-60. Because of the narrow focus of this Note, I will not discuss the overbreadth
issue addressed by all of the concurring justices.
264 See id. at 2561-63 (Stevens, J., concurring).
255 Id. at 2562. Justice Stevens claimed that content-based distinctions were inevitable and
necessary at all levels of First. Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 2563.
256 1d. justice Stevens explained that the content of the material determines whether it is
obscenity or child pornography. Id.
257 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2563 (Stevens, J., concurring).
258 Id. at 2567.
259 Id.
261' Id.
261 Id. at 2569.
262 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2569 (Stevens, j., concurring).
2113 Id.
264 id.
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Justice Stevens clarified his position by explaining that the St. Paul
ordinance regulated a category of expression that caused injury based
on race, ethnicity, religion and gender. 265
 The ordinance was not view-
point discriminatory, argued Justice Stevens, because it barred both
sides of the debate over tolerance or intolerance from throwing
fighting words at one another based on the target's race, color, creed,
religion or gender. 266
 Justice Stevens concluded that were the St. Paul
ordinance not overbroad, it would be constitutional. 267
Justice Blackmun wrote a short concurrence that criticized the
majority for "setting the law and logic on their heads." 268
 Justice Black-
mun argued that the majority, by holding that all fighting words must
be regulated equally, effectively weakened the protection of all
speech."' justice Blackmun explained that if the Court can no longer
categorize speech into that protected and that not protected by the
First Amendment, protection for all speech will be weakened. 2" On
the other hand, Blackmun concluded that the majority's opinion may
not change First Amendment jurisprudence at all, but instead be
considered an aberration. 271
 Although Justice Blackmun found the St.
Paul ordinance overbroad, he stated that he saw nothing unconstitu-
tional about St. Paul specifically punishing race-based fighting words. 272
The majority in RA. V. found the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance to be an unconstitutional content-based restriction on
speech.2" The concurring Justices, however, all agreed that the major-
ity abandoned long accepted First Amendment analysis and instead
concluded that the statute was unconstitutional on the basis of over-
breadth. 274
 Thus, according to the United States Supreme Court, states
cannot constitutionally punish hate speech through bias-motivated
crime statutes.275
265 Id. at 2570 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens pointed out in this section of his
concurring opinion the similarity between this interpretation and the interpretation of the child
pornography statute in New York v. Ferber, an argument that became the basis of this Note. Id. at
2570. In Ferber; the Court relied on the psychological and physical injury sustained by children
as a result of their involvement in the making of child pornography to uphold a prohibition on
its sale and distribution. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982). See supra notes 162-74
and accompanying text for a discussion of Ferber
266 R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2571 (Stevens, J., concurring).
267 Id.
268 Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
269 Id.
270 1d.
271 R.A.V., 112 S. CL at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
272 Id. at 2561.
273 Id. at 2542.
274
 Id. at 2551 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 2561
(Stevens, J., concurring).
275 Id. at 2542.
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IV. HATE SPEECH AS AN UNPROTECTED CATEGORY OF SPEECH
Some people's freedom hurts other people's equality. 276
In striking down St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, the
Supreme Court abandoned long accepted First Amendment doctrine
to avoid opening the door for a more narrowly drawn ordinance to be
considered constitutional. The Court's categorical refusal to allow
states to restrict biased speech, especially when the restriction applies
to biased fighting words, contravenes traditional notions of First
Amendment law. Further, the R.A. V decision ignores the conclusions
of forty-six states that there is a compelling state interest in displaying
the majorities' viewpoint that racial, ethnic, religious and gender-based
fighting words will not be tolerated, and in ensuring that a huge
segment of America's population is protected from the indignities and
the physiological and psychological effects of bias-motivated speech.
Finally, the Court's language and its treatment of the St. Paul ordi-
nance is totally contradictory to the Court's own treatment of other
areas of restricted speech because of its insensitivity to minorities and
the psychological damage incurred as a result of hate crimes.
The majority distorted traditional First Amendment jurisprudence
in R.A. V. Rather than applying strict scrutiny to the ordinance to
determine if a compelling state interest existed for the regulation of
bias-motivated fighting words, the majority decided that fighting words,
words that fall outside the First Amendment, deserve constitutional
protection. 277 This proposition seems contrary to logic and precedent:
Ghaplinsky held that fighting words are of so little value that they do
not deserve constitutional protection. 278 Under RA. V, however, bias-
motivated fighting words, a subset of a category of unprotected speech,
can arguably receive more protection than neutral fighting words. The
majority's refusal to allow St. Paul to punish bias-motivated fighting
words contravenes First Amendment analysis as it was developed in
Chaplinshy, Roth, Barnes and Ferber because St. Paul articulated a com-
pelling state interest, the Court has recognized that certain speech has
little value, and the preservation of morality in society can justify an
infringement on certain speech.
276 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights 	 Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
1, 8 (1985).
277 See R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2543. The Court explained that statements that certain categories
of speech are not within the scope of constitutionally protected expression "must be taken in
context" and are not "literally true." Id. at 2543.
278 Chaplinthy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). See supra notes 103-15 and
accompanying text.
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A. St. Paul Articulated a Compelling State Interest
Assuming that the St. Paul ordinance is a content-based regulation
of fighting words, it must serve a compelling state interest to be con-
sidered constitutional. in refusing to accept St. Paul's asserted interests
in regulating bias-motivated fighting words, the Court ignored its own
precedents and revealed its lack of concern for the victims of hate
speech. Although the Court allegedly accepted that St. Paul had an
interest in promoting tolerance and protecting minority groups that
have been historically subject to discrimination, it suggested that St.
Paul could achieve the same goals by enacting a statute that proscribed
all fighting words. A neutral fighting words statute, however, would not
serve St. Paul's articulated interest because it would not target the most
damaging aspect of bias-motivated fighting words—their message of
racial hatred. The Court's assertion that a neutral statute would serve
St. Paul's interests reveals that it does not find racially prejudiced
speech and conduct morally culpable.
A community such as St. Paul has an interest in directly facing the
issues of racial, ethnic, religious and gender inequality and combating
the dangers of supremacist attacks on individuals based on their mem-
bership in a certain group. As evidenced by the research of Kenneth
Clark and the more recent study involving the effect of racist speech
on black debaters, hate speech has tangible effects on its victims and
society as a whole. 27° Messages of inequality serve to imprint on their
minority listeners a belief in their own inequality and lack of self-
worth. 28° An individual who sees him or herself as less important or less
valued in society will contribute less to society. 281 More importantly, the
evidence that black children suffer from low self-esteem and often
carry this feeling into adulthood resulting in more severe symptoms
such as alcoholism, drug addiction or unemployment reinforces the
need for communities to take a strong stance against racial bias. 282 St.
Paul, and society as a whole, have a compelling interest in curbing the
use of bias-motivated crimes as a tool for securing the social inequality
of certain groups, and in voicing its intolerance for actions and words
that contribute to negative characteristics in targeted groups.
The United States Supreme Court, as recently as 1991, has held
that communities can prohibit some types of expression in order to
279 See supra notes 34-64 and accompanying text.
28° See, supra note 39 and accompanying text_
281 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
282 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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protect or promote a certain moral climate."' In refusing to apply this
reasoning to the St. Paul ordinance, the Court has implicitly decided
that racist fighting words are morally acceptable in St. Paul and the
rest of the United States. The Court has also explicitly revealed its
willingness to allow regulation in areas where they find the activity in
controversy morally culpable, but not in the areas where they refuse to
recognize the immoral nature of the activity.
For example, in Barnes, a case decided one year before R.A.V., the
Court upheld Indiana's prohibition on nude dancing on the basis of
preserving morality."84 In Barnes, justice Scalia championed the pro-
motion of morals as the basis for state regulation of certain speech.le''
The same argument exists with hate speech. Webster's Dictionary of
Modern. English defines immoral as "corrupt" or "unethical." "6 Society
has long recognized that messages of racial, ethnic, religious and
gender-based supremacy are corrupt messages and ones that are con-
tradictory to the guarantees of equality and justice for all. The Court
had ample opportunity to uphold the St. Paul ordinance as an expres-
sion of St. Paul's belief in the morality of equality. In fact, when
compared to the prohibition in Barnes, involving a statute regulating
public nudity, the St. Paul ordinance is even more essential for protect-
ing the moral fabric of our society. Nudity and nude dancing are
essentially victimless activities engaged in by consenting adults. On the
other hand, there are real victims who stiffer from crimes motivated
by racial bias.
B. An Argument far a Victim-Centered Approach
The compelling interest in regulating hate speech, and the argu-
ment for its regulation as an expression against the immorality of hate
speech, can most likely find acceptance if viewed in light of the victims
of hate crimes. Child pornography is an area of regulated speech that
has received this type of analysis. In Ferber, the Court examined the
damage to children involved in child pornography." 7 The Court cited
the negative effects on children who participate in child pornography,
283 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Ill S. Ct. 2456, 2460-61 (1991) (Indiana has substantial
governmental interest in prolecting societal order and morality). Sec supra notes 138-61 and
accompanying text for a full discussion of Baron
284 Id. at 2462. Although uncomfO•table making this argument because of the inherent
danger in suggesting the legislation of morality, I pose it simply to show that it was clearly available
to the RA. V. Court, had they decided to make it.
285 See id. at 2465.
286 INusTER'S 1)1CTIoNARY oF MODERN ENGLISH 269 (1987).
287 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 ti.9 (1982).
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including their probable sexual abuse and exploitation, the inability
to develop healthy adult relationships later in life, sexual dysfunctions
and the tendency to become sexual abusers. 288
 In accepting the possi-
ble avoidance of these conditions as a compelling state interest that
justified the prohibition of child pornography, the Court asserted that
the interest in protecting the physical and psychological health and
welfare of children is "beyond the need for elaboration." 2" After all, a
society that does not value the psychological well-being of its children
does not value the well-being of its own future.
A similar argument can be made for the regulation of hate crimes.
Hate crimes are known to cause physical and emotional illness in
victims."' In addition to causing fear and anger, hate speech perpetu-
ates historical stereotypes that have tangible negative effects on its
victims. Like children who participate in child pornography, the vic-
tims of hate crimes suffer the long-lasting effects of racial, ethnic,
religious and gender bias. Child pornography statistics revealed the
danger to children inherent in the industry and were used to support
what most people already believed—child pornography is dangerous
and of little social value. Similarly, the data set out in section I of this
Note supports what psychologists and forty-six states already know-
bias-motivated crimes are the ultimate form of racial prejudice and are
not only immoral but result in lowered self-esteem, a sense of worth-
lessness, lack of motivation for success or contribution to society, and
in some cases, severe emotional and physical distress in their victims."
The Court should have fashioned the same argument against hate
speech that it invoked against child pornography. The speech in ques-
tion, bias-motivated fighting words, is of so little value that the danger-
ous and lasting effects of hate speech outweigh any value they might
bring to society. In the case of child pornography, the fact that most
people considered child pornography to be essentially devoid of artis-
tic, social or political value, in conjunction with the overwhelming
evidence that it had serious effects on the children involved in its
making, allowed the Court to uphold a content-based regulation. 292
The same reasoning would apply in the case of bias-motivated fighting
words (the words targeted by the St. Paul ordinance): fighting words
are not considered speech for purposes of the First Amendment, 2"
288 Id.
289 Id. at 756.
290 See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 34-74 and accompanying text.
292 See Supra notes 158-70 and accompanying text
293 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
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therefore in conjunction with the evidence that there are substantial
negative effects of racially motivated speech on targeted groups, the
Court could have upheld the St. Paul ordinance.
Critics may argue that the interest in regulating child pornogra-
phy stems from the damage done specifically to children. Although
racist hate speech may often be targeted at adults, the overall societal
prejudice conveyed transcends generations and perpetuates negative
stereotypes. 2t 4 By not allowing the regulation of racist fighting words,
the United States Supreme Court allows for the damaging effects of
prejudice to be passed on to future generations. Thus, as in the case
of child pornography, there are innocent victims at stake.
V. CONCLUSION
Morally, we all recognize hate as an evil, and we have long
struggled as a society to understand hate as a sickness. But legally
we must increasingly confront hate as a vicious breaking of the
law. 2"'
The Court's treatment of hate crime legislation in RA. V. v. St.
Paul signals a dangerous green light for those who want to intimidate
and threaten members of racial, ethnic, religious and gender groups.
The Court abandoned traditional First Amendment doctrine and vir-
tually abolished any hope that states can effectively regulate criminal
activity based on notions of supremacy. The Court can, however, aban-
don this interpretation and accept that states have a compelling inter-
est in rejecting criminal messages of inequality based on common
notions of morality and the need to safeguard certain individuals and
minority groups from the lasting effects of hate speech. By recognizing
the damage that hate speech inflicts on its victims, the Court can
appreciate the need for ordinances like the St. Paul Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance and find ample precedent for deeming them consti-
tutional.
ANDREA L. CROWLEY
294 See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text
295 Attorney General Dick Thornburgh as quoted in ADL LAw REPORT, supra note 7, at 20.
